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                       UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                      CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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                             SOUTHERN DIVISION
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    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                    ) Case No. SA CR 08-180-DOC
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               Plaintiff,
                                      STIPULATION RE CONTINUANCE OF
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                                      TRIAL DATE TO NOVEMBER 8, 2011
                                      AT 8:30 A.M. AND EXCLUDABLE
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                                      TIME
    MOSES ONCIU, BEATA GIZELLA
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    PRIORE, and IRENE PEMKOVA,
                                    ) New Trial Date: November 8,
                                      2011
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               Defendants.
                                      Proposed New Time: 8:30 a.m.
                                    ) Place: Courtroom of the
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                                    ) Honorable David O. Carter
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         Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its
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   counsel of record, the United States Attorney for the Central
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   District of California, and defendants, Moses Onciu, by and
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   through his counsel of record, Gerald Werksman, Beata Gizella
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   Priore, by and through her counsel of record, Joel Levine, and
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   Irene Pemkova, by and through her counsel of record, Diane Bass,
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1. Defendants Onciu and Priore first appeared before a judicial officer in the court in which this charge is pending on

stipulate as follows.

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August 4, 2008. The Indictment in this case was filed on July 2, 2008. The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., originally required that the trial as to defendants Onciu and Priore commence on or before October 13, 2008. Defendant Pemkova first appeared before a judicial officer in the court in which this charge is pending on August 18, 2008. The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., originally required that the trial as to defendant Pemkova commence on or before October 27, 2008.

- 2. On August 4, 2008, defendants Onciu and Priore were arraigned on the Indictment and the Court set a trial date of September 30, 2008. On August 18, 2008, defendant Pemkova was arraigned on the Indictment and the Court set the same trial date of September 30, 2008.
- 3. Defendants are released on bond pending trial. The parties estimate that the government's case-in-chief in the trial of this matter will last approximately 6 days.
- 4. The Court has previously continued the trial date in this case from September 30, 2008 to April 26, 2011 upon the parties' stipulation, and found the interim period to be excluded in computing the time within which the trial must commence, pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act.
- 5. By this stipulation, the parties jointly move to continue the trial date from April 26, 2011 to November 8, 2011 at 8:30 a.m.
- 6. The parties request the continuance based upon the following facts, which the parties believe demonstrate good cause to support the appropriate findings under the Speedy Trial Act:

- Pursuant to defendants' requests, the government 1 a) 2 produced to defendants approximately 500 pages of discovery including search warrants and a written affidavit, voluminous 3 email messages and attachments, memoranda of interviews, 4 investigative reports, criminal history printouts, IP address 5 printouts, and other documentation. In addition, the government 6 produced to defendants many hours of audio recordings of dozens 7 of telephone conversations and an in-person meeting, had these 8 recordings transcribed, and produced to defendants draft 9 transcripts of these recordings, which encompassed over 400 10 Subsequently, the government located additional portions 11 of some of these audio recordings that were incomplete at the 12 13 time of the original production, had those portions transcribed, and produced to defendants the additional portions of the 14 recordings and draft transcripts of these recordings. The 15 government has also disclosed its intent to offer testimony at trial from two expert witnesses. 17
 - b) Defendant Pemkova recently disclosed that she anticipates offering testimony from two expert witnesses at trial. However, these witnesses are not available to testify at the time that the trial is currently scheduled.

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c) In addition, defendant Pemkova's counsel has a federal trial scheduled for July 2011 and another investment fraud trial scheduled in this court in September 2011 and, as a result, is unavailable to try this case on a new date when defendant Pemkova's expert witnesses are available. Accordingly, defendant Pemkova's counsel represents that failure to grant the continuance will deny defendant Pemkova continuity of counsel and

adequate representation.

- d) Counsel for defendants represent that additional time is necessary to confer with defendants, conduct and complete an independent investigation of the case, conduct and complete additional legal research including for potential pre-trial motions, review the discovery and potential evidence in the case, including that produced by the government, to obtain additional discovery that defendants may seek from the government, to review that additional discovery after it is produced, and prepare for trial. Defense counsel represent that failure to grant the continuance would deny them reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
- e) Defendants' counsel have discussed this stipulation with defendants and defendants consent to the requested continuance. The government does not object to the continuance.
- 7. For purposes of computing the date under the Speedy Trial Act by which defendants' trial must commence, the parties agree that the time period of April 26, 2011 to November 8, 2011, inclusive, should be excluded pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A), (h)(7)(B)(i), and (B)(iv) because the delay results from a continuance granted by the court at defendants' request, without government objection, on the basis of the court's finding that: (i) the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and defendants in a speedy trial; (ii) failure to grant the continuance would be likely to make a continuation of the

proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice, that it is unreasonable to expect preparation for pre-trial proceedings or for the trial itself within the time limits established by the Speedy Trial Act; (iii) failure to grant the continuance would deny defense counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence; and (iv) failure to grant the continuance would unreasonably deny defendants continuity of counsel and would deny defense counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

- 8. In addition, the parties agree that the time period of April 26, 2011 to November 8, 2011, inclusive, should be excluded pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(3)(A), because it results from the unavailability of essential witnesses.
- 9. The parties further agree that the time period of April 26, 2011 to November 8, 2011, inclusive, should be excluded pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(6), because it is a reasonable period of delay resulting from defendants' joinder for trial with each other, the time for trial of defendants has not run, and no motion for severance has been granted.
- 10. Nothing in this stipulation shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods be excluded from the period within which trial must commence. Moreover, the same provisions and/or other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act may in the future authorize / / /

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the exclusion of additional time periods from the period within which trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: March 31, 2011.

ANDRÉ BIROTTE JR. United States Attorney

DENNISE D. WILLETT Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Santa Ana Branch

_____/S/ LAWRENCE E. KOLE Assistant United States Attorney

Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America

I am Moses Onciu's attorney. I have carefully discussed this stipulation and the continuance of the trial date with my client. I have fully informed my client of his Speedy Trial rights. To my knowledge, my client understands those rights. I believe that my client's decision to give up the right to be brought to trial earlier than November 8, 2011 is an informed and voluntary one.

Dated: March , 2011.

GERALD WERKSMAN

Attorney for Defendant Moses Onciu

I am Beata Gizella Priore's attorney. I have carefully discussed this stipulation and the continuance of the trial date with my client. I have fully informed my client of her Speedy Trial rights. To my knowledge, my client understands those rights. I believe that my client's decision to give up the right

the exclusion of additional time periods from the period within which trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: March ___, 2011.

ANDRÉ BIROTTE JR. United States Attorney

DENNISE D. WILLETT Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Santa Ana Branch

LAWRENCE E. KOLE
Assistant United States Attorney
Attorneys for Plaintiff United
States of America

I am Moses Onciu's attorney. I have carefully discussed this stipulation and the continuance of the trial date with my client. I have fully informed my client of his Speedy Trial rights. To my knowledge, my client understands those rights. I believe that my client's decision to give up the right to be brought to trial earlier than November 8, 2011 is an informed and voluntary one.

Dated: March ___, 2011.

GERALD WERKSMAN

Attorney for Defendant Moses Onciu

I am Beata Gizella Priore's attorney. I have carefully discussed this stipulation and the continuance of the trial date with my client. I have fully informed my client of her Speedy Trial rights. To my knowledge, my client understands those rights. I believe that my client's decision to give up the right

to be brought to trial earlier than November 8, 2011 is an informed and voluntary one.

Dated: March 30, 2011.



Attorney for Defendant Beata Gizella Priore

I am Irene Pemkova's attorney. I have carefully discussed this stipulation and the continuance of the trial date with my client. I have fully informed my client of her Speedy Trial rights. To my knowledge, my client understands those rights. I believe that my client's decision to give up the right to be brought to trial earlier than November 8, 2011 is an informed and voluntary one.

Dated: March , 2011.

DIANE BASS

Attorney for Defendant Irene Pemkova

to be brought to trial earlier than November 8, 2011 is an informed and voluntary one. Dated: March __, 2011. JOEL LEVINE Attorney for Defendant Beata Gizella Priore I am Irene Pemkova's attorney. I have carefully discussed this stipulation and the continuance of the trial date with my client. I have fully informed my client of her Speedy Trial rights. To my knowledge, my client understands those rights. I believe that my client's decision to give up the right to be brought to trial earlier than November 8, 2011 is an informed and voluntary one. Dated: March 31, 2011. Attorney for Defendant Irene Pemkova

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   Attorneys for Plaintiff
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                       UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                       CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
11
                              SOUTHERN DIVISION
12
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                     ) Case No. SA CR 08-180-DOC
13
               Plaintiff,
                                       [PROPOSED] ORDER CONTINUING
14
                                       TRIAL DATE TO NOVEMBER 8, 2011
                                     ) AT 8:30 A.M. AND REGARDING
15
                                       EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIOD UNDER
    MOSES ONCIU, BEATA GIZELLA
                                     ) SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
16
    PRIORE, and IRENE PEMKOVA,
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               Defendants.
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The Court has read and considered the Stipulation re Excludable Time Period under Speedy Trial Act filed by the parties in this matter on March 31, 2011. The Court hereby finds that the Stipulation, which this Court incorporates by reference into this Order, demonstrates facts that provide good cause for a finding of excludable time pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161.

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The Court further finds that: (1) the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and defendant in a speedy trial; (2) failure to grant the continuance

would be likely to make a continuation of the proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice; (3) failure to grant the continuance would unreasonably deny defendants continuity of counsel and would deny defense counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, (4) this continuance results from the unavailability of essential witnesses, and (5) this continuance is a reasonable period of delay resulting from defendants' joinder with each other for trial, the time for trial of defendants has not run, and no motion for severance has been granted.

THEREFORE, FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

- The trial in this matter is continued from April 26,
 to November 8, 2011 at 8:30 a.m.
- 2. The time period of April 26, 2011 to November 8, 2011, inclusive, is excluded in computing the time within which the trial must commence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(3)(A), (h)(6), (h)(7)(A), (h)(7)(B)(I), and (B)(iv).
- 3. Nothing in this Order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excluded from the period within which trial must commence. Moreover, the same provisions and/or other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act may in the future authorize the exclusion

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1	of additional time periods from the period within which trial
2	must commence.
3	Dated:
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6	Honorable David O. Carter
7	United States District Judge
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